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ABSTRACT / One of the enduring facts of the human condi- 
tion is that the earth's resources are finite and its environment 
fragile. It is also evident that human behavior is rarely based 
on an appreciation of these facts. While the outlook may be 
bleak, so are some of the proposed solutions. Reasonable 
people have suggested that, to survive, an environmentally 
enlightened authoritarian government must be adopted. This 
article suggests that such a solution is unworkable, in part 
because it fails to consider critical aspects of human nature. 
A framework is proposed for developing solutions compatible 
with human capabilities. 
There is considerable evidence that society is facing 
environmental limits. Close scrutiny of recent research 
points to a real and growing danger of adverse cli- 
mactic change, depletion of the earth's resources, and 
irreversible damage to the global ecosystem (Catton 
1982, Council on Environmental Quality and US De- 
partment of State 1980, Brown .1981). 
The "Tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968) has 
proven a useful concept for understanding how we 
have come to be at the brink of ecological catastrophe. 
People face a dangerous situation created not by evil 
outside forces, bu tby  the apparendy appropriate and 
innocent actions of many individuals. This by now 
widely known paradigm is applicable in its broader 
sense to a great many environmental problems. 
Hardin has suggested that resource depletion and en- 
vironmental degradation result from the seemingly 
reasonable decision-making dynamic of rationality. 
Dawes (1973, 1975, and 1980) and others (1977) have 
expanded the theoretical bases for research on 
commons dilemmas by suggesting that the entire series 
of decision-making tragedies (for example, the pris- 
oner's dilemma, the n-person social dilemma games) 
may all be mathematically equivalent. 1 Simply stated, 
we face a serious dilemma which, although constantly 
reoccurring, has never been solved--an instance 
where individual rational behavior (that is, acting 
without restraint to maximize short-term gain) causes 
great long-range harm to oneself and others (Platt 
1973). 
The seriousness of  the commons dilemma suggests 
the need for people to begin adopting and main- 
taining ecologically compatible patterns of  behavior. 
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For a variety of reasons, this has proven to be a diffi- 
cult task. This article explores a possible framework 
within which acceptable solutions to the tragedy of the 
commons can be found, and will: 
1) Point out why a much talked about approach to 
environmental problems, authoritarianism, is of 
questionable efficacy. 
2) Suggest that the existing framework of "muddling 
through" is an effective way of enlisting human 
ingenuity in the effort to resolve the tragedy of 
the commons. 
3) Suggest several key enhancements to muddling 
that will overcome certain crucial weaknesses in 
this process. 
The approach presented here takes as its starting 
point two criteria that a solution must meet in order to 
be successful: compatibility with human nature and 
compatibility with available natural resources. These 
criteria have emerged from an analysis of why poten- 
tial solutions to the tragedy of the commons have 
failed to make headway. Each is briefly outlined 
below. 
Since current patterns of human behavior seem to 
be at odds with long-term survival, many solutions 
propose altering these patterns. A solution that seeks 
to alter human behavior significantly should be sensi- 
tive to basic human concerns3 One of the most salient 
human concerns to emerge is the need to maintain a 
degree of  choice. A second issue involves limiting a so- 
lution's requirement for natural resources to those 
currently a,)ailable. It seems prudent  to treat existing 
resources as if they are all we will ever have. Relying 
on an increased drawdown of  current reserves or the 
ever-continuing discovery of  new resources will, at 
best, only delay the onset of  shortages. These, then, 
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are the criteria that we will use to explore proposed 
solutions to the environmental dilemma being faced. 
Coercive Solutions 
Investigators in a variety of  fields have come to the 
same conclusion: the future is indeed bleak unless 
major changes are made in patterns of resource use. 
Understandably, a great sense of urgency pervades re- 
cent writings on this topic and there is a willingness to 
consider solutions that constitute a major departure 
from current political practices. 
Some scholars, seeking solutions to what they have 
identified as an impending ecocatastrophe, have 
sought them within the confines of the democratic 
process. Hardin (1968), with refreshing honesty, has 
focused attention on a lack of sufficient ~ coercion 
within such processes. Only by seeing the necessity of  
mutually agreed-upon coercion can ecocatastrophe be 
avoided. This perspective has a c.ertain intuitive rea- 
sonableness. There  are, it seems, many solutions avail- 
able, but like spoiled children we have not made our- 
selves behave. Yet mutual coercion has at least two im- 
plementational weaknesses. First, by eliminating 
choice, coercion increases "the likelihood o f  resistance 
and opposition, phenomena discussed in more detail 
below. But even more fatal politically and psychologi- 
cally may be the perception that "mutual coercion mu- 
tually agreed upon" leads to a grim future. 
Other scholars, in formulating more radical solu- 
tions, tend to agree that (a) democratic systems of  gov- 
ernment are simply not up to the challenge as they are 
unable to act quickly and without compromise, and (b) 
we cannot rely only on individual prudence or disci- 
pline (Hardin and Baden 1977, Heilbroner 1975, 
Ophuls 1977). 
Heilbroner (1975) suggests that "There will be no 
escape from the necessity of  a centralized administra- 
tion for our industrial world." Ophuls (1977) likewise 
contends that resource scarcity will produce "over- 
whelming pressures toward political systems that are 
frankly authoritarian." Thus, these scholars propose a 
centralized and often authoritarian solution in place of  
weak democratic institutions--a solution that would 
include the centralization of  environmental planning, 
resource allocation, and political power (Orr and Hill 
1978). 
While the tragedy of  the commons is a distressing 
event, the proposed authoritarian solution might well 
be equally disturbing. Nevertheless, the proponents of  
the authoritarian solution are not Machiavellian. They 
view the problem to be of  such a great magnitude and 
urgency that people can neither wait for the demo- 
cratic process to act nor tolerate the resulting compro- 
mise solutions. Their approach is viewed as a neces- 
sary evil, one that addresses the realities of  ecological 
limits, not political acceptability. Authoritarianism, 
with its apparent direct and uncompromising ap- 
proach, is, they argue, the only hope. 
Reactance to the Elimination of Choice 
While coercive solutions are perceived as over- 
coming the weaknesses of  democratic institutions and 
human nature, they are not without their own limita- 
tions. A problem with solutions that eliminate choice is 
the undesirable effects they have on individuals (Var- 
gish 1980). The characteristic negative human reaction 
to strong coercion has been analyzed in the context of  
psychological reactance theory. Psychological reac- 
tance is the motivational state of a person whose 
freedom has been constrained (Brehm 1966, Brehm 
and Brehm 1981). It is a response by which people 
show increased desire for a forbidden alternative or 
decreased desire for what they feel forced to do. This 
phenomenon is more than just a disturbing possibility. 
Reactance effects have been noted in numerous inves- 
tigations including the study of legal prohibitions 
(Mazis 1975) and strongly worded prompts for pro- 
environmental action (Reich and Robertson 1979). 
The tendency to react against compulsory changes 
that involve one without consent appears to be a rather 
general phenomenon. 
Loss of Diversity and the Potential for Grave Error 
Nonetheless, some might conclude that the risk of 
reactance is a cost one must bear. The authoritarian 
solution is not, after all, a preferred solution; the ar- 
gument is rather that it is a necessary one. n Taking a 
step that is so decisively against the grain of  human 
nature could, of course, only be justified in terms of its 
unequivocal effectiveness in the utilization of available 
resources. 
Centralized planning attempts to manage re- 
sources, and simultaneously overcome human weak- 
nesses, by applying one pattern to all possible settings. 
This approach reduces the chance of  people "messing 
things up," but also loses the diversity and resilience so 
essential to effective resource management. 4 Consider 
such federal energy conservation effort as the building 
temperature setback program with one target temper- 
ature for all climactic regions and building types. 
While such federal efforts have been evaluated as gen- 
erally ineffective, there have been notable successes at 
the local level, each demonstrating a sensitivity to local 
conditions (Ridgeway 1979, Stem and Aronson 1984). 
A related issue is the ability of authoritarianism to 
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commit a large percentage of available resources to 
what is judged  to be a vital project. While the urgency 
of  the environmental crises would seem to demand 
such a response, it entails considerable risk. There  is 
the danger of  making large-scale resource allocation 
errors. In fact, the potential for grave errors may be a 
major risk of  the authoritarian approach. As Lindblom 
(1979) notes, 
authoritarian systems are at least occasionally capable--apparently 
more often than in democratic systems--of such nonincremental 
change as the abrupt collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet 
Union and the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in 
China (as well as the Holocaust and the recent destruction of Cam- 
bodia's cities and much of its population). 
Thus, authoritarian systems may be less effective at 
avoiding ecocatastrophe than their proponents believe. 
What we know to be the limitations of  large-scale insti- 
tutions casts doubt on the appropriateness of an au- 
thoritarian approach (Orr and Hi l l  1978, Lindblom 
1979). Such an approach, while consuming valuable 
resources, may contribute nothing to the problem at 
hand. 
Muddling Through: A Framework for an 
Active Organism 
In addition to identifying the dangers of  authoritar- 
ianism, Lindblom (1959 and 1979) has nominated a 
candidate to take its place, a modest and incremental 
technique he calls "muddling through." This tech- 
nique has a sufficient array of desirable properties to 
deserve a closer look? 
Muddling is highly compatible with human nature. 
One seeks the advice o f  those people most affected by 
the decision, checks out every step in advance for ac- 
ceptability, and never ventures far from the result o f  
past changes. Muddling is conservative in a functional 
way: it does not ignore traditional values or beliefs 
(Ophuls 1977). The  outcome of  muddling is a prac- 
tical solution, one that at least makes a marginal con- 
tribution to the problem at hand. 
One of  the important contributions that Johnson 
has made is the fusion of  the muddling process and 
environmental problems (Johnson 1978 and 1985). 
Johnson has shown that the prevalent human ten- 
dency to "make do" can aid us in adopting a frugal 
way of  life without the need for an authoritarian bu- 
reaucracy. 
The Problem of Small Steps 
It  is easy to see why people would opt for mud- 
dling. Muddling acknowledges the many constraints 
facing people as they seek solutions. It demands, not 
an optimal, but an adequate and acceptable solution. 
And what limitations do exist are discovered and dealt 
with early in the process. Nonetheless, muddling has 
serious weaknesses that render  it ineffective in dealing 
with the tragedy of  the commons. 
The  proponents of authoritarianism would have 
the same reservations with muddling as they have with 
all democratic approaches. Muddling is a process char- 
acterized by a slowness in taking even modest steps, a 
tendency to compromise, and an avoidance of  signifi- 
cant bold or visionary steps (Johnson 1978). These 
features of muddling offer much valued stability, but 
also prevent adapting to quickly changing circum- 
stances. 
Muddling as a Process of Sequential Exploration 
It is of considerable interest in solving commons di- 
lemmas to have the ability to explore a variety of  po- 
tential solutions at the same time. It is our  perception 
that the proponents of  the muddling and authOri- 
tarian approaches may suffer in this respect. It would 
appear that they function by pursuing one solution at 
a time. Certainly they are capable of  intelligently dis- 
cussing alternative courses of action, but the outcome 
of  such discussion usually is the selection of  one option 
for implementation. Furthermore,  this selection is 
more often based on political acceptability than on the 
feedback of facts or the reports from what one might 
call field tests. Essentially, an entire society explores a 
chosen solution. Implementing solutions on a national 
level without the benefit of  pilot testing may strike the 
reader as risky. The  failure o f  a solution could be 
cosily, disastrous, or both. As an example one need 
only consider the "payment in kind" program that 
seemed to be a good solution to the huge US farm 
product  surplus until the solution was implemented 
nationwide. Clearly, what was perceived to be an ef- 
fective solution at the conceptual stage proved other- 
wise. It would seem less than prudent  to move quickly 
from the conceptual stage to full-scale implementation 
without the benefit of  smaller-scale explorations. Nev- 
ertheless, it seems to go on all the time. 
Under  certain conditions, this would be a tolerable 
approach to solving the tragedy of  the commons. Any 
problems encountered at the larger scale could be 
handled in the next iteration of  muddling. But t he  
tragedy of  the commons is presented as an urgent 
problem. The  crisis of scarcity being envisioned is 
characterized by unprecedented rapid change from a 
state of  abundance to one o f  want (Hardin 1968, Heil- 
broner  1975, Ophuls 1977). T h e r e  might well not be 
enough time or resources fo r  muddling's one-at-a- 
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time, trial-and-error process of stumbling toward the 
right solution. 
There are, thus, several reasons why something 
more than muddling is needed. It is awkwardly slow in 
practice and tends to pursue only one large-scale ex- 
ploration at a time. And this exploration involves an 
often untested solution implemented at a large scale. 
Without some adjustment, muddling will not be of 
much help. 
The weaknesses of muddling have been acknowl- 
edged by other scholars and a number of alternative 
decision-making procedures have been proposed. One 
procedure that has received considerable attention is 
mixed scanning (Etzioni 1967). Mixed scanning has 
two main components, the first being a rational, opti- 
mizing procedure used for making fundamental 
policy decisions. The second component, incremental- 
ism, is used once the basic policy direction is specified. 
This incrementalism allows for gradual change in the 
basic policy until such time as the need for a funda- 
mental change is recognized (Janis and Mann 1983). 
Although apparently promising, upon closer exam- 
ination this approach is found to suffer from the 
elitism common to most 'decision-making procedures. 
Mixed scanning, even by a self-conscious decision 
maker, is still centralized, expert-based planning. It 
may be true that mixed scanning allows for more envi- 
ronmental inputs than are commonly considered in 
muddling (Bradley 1973). However, it does not neces- 
sarily open up the decision-making process to more 
people or ideas. It is also not clear how it overcomes 
the pitfalls of coercion discussed earlier. 
Adaptive Muddling 
We suggest that it is possible to build upon people's 
natural tendency to muddle through. It is worth sal- 
vaging the powerful advantages of muddling if its ten- 
dency toward slowness, compromise, and lack of direc- 
tion can be overcome. We propose that muddling be 
improved by introducing three distinct facets of the 
decision-making process: exploration, stability, and 
distributed leadership. We are calling this new' frame- 
work adaptive muddling. 6 
The three elements of adaptive muddling are not 
new concepts. They are found within various decision- 
making frameworks. Exploration sometimes seems to 
be the main task of industrial society. Stability is a 
much valued feature of any decision-making process. 
It is often used to describe the advantage that demo- 
cratic systems have over other, more volatile governing 
models. And leadership has always played a pivotal 
role in human endeavors. 
While each element has merit on its own, none does 
well in isolation. The effectiveness of adaptive mud- 
dling is based on the manner in which these three ele- 
ments are included in a single framework. Explora- 
tion, stability, and distributed leadership are mutually 
dependent elements that function better when linked 
together into a system. Each makes the others possible 
and each derives needed input or support from the 
others. 
A key feature of adaptive muddling is the relation- 
ship of scale to function. In the midst of a heated de- 
bate between the advantages of large-scale or small- 
scale solutions, Schumacher (1973) has suggested a 
middle ground. His concept of "intermediate tech- 
nology" highlights the importance of finding the ap- 
propriate scale for solving a problem, not just the 
smallest scale. Using this approach, one looks for what 
each level of scale does best and allocates decision- 
making responsibility accordingly. In adaptive mud- 
dling, explorations are pursued at the smaller scale 
while stability is provided at a larger scale. As a system, 
however, adaptive muddling is not scale specific. It is 
easily as applicable to county-level issues as to national 
or multinational problem solving. 
Exploration 
One of the strengths of adaptive muddling is re- 
lated to the small scale of these explorations. Both the 
authoritarian and conventional muddling approaches, 
by virtue of their focus on large-scale problems, tend 
to consider large-scale, national solutions. It is our as- 
sessment that the result is the implementation of only 
one solution at a time. In contrast, adaptive muddling 
allows explorations to be pursued at a smaller scale, 
making it possible to analyze, design, and implement a 
variety of alternative solutions simultaneously. Any 
successful small-scale explorations can be considered 
for implementation at a larger scale. 
Such an approach is tolerant of failure for at no 
time is the entire resource base jeopardized. And yet 
adaptive muddling is not risk free. One's success or 
failure has relevance to the larger context. Failure will 
be felt by both the exploratory groups and all others 
who await a solution to the tragedy of the commons. 
The result is a heightened sense of genuineness and 
connectedness born of knowing that one is trying to 
solve an urgent dilemma. 
The scale of the explorations can relate to the size 
of the individual experiments, the size of the group 
doing the experiment, or both. Numerous American 
communities have explored how they might make sig- 
nificant local changes in the way they use energy. Each 
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exploration has helped contribute to what might well 
become a national energy policy. During the last de- 
cade, many small towns have experimented with en- 
ergy conservation programs. Osage, Iowa, with a pop- 
ulation of  only 3800, responded to the energy crisis of  
the early 1970s by promoting conservation rather than 
the construction of new utility plants (Daniels and 
Farley 1986). Osage explored a wide variety of ap- 
proaches and the results were impressive enough to 
win the 1984 Award for Energy Innovation from the 
Department of Energy. Since the mid-1970s, their 
overall electrical consumption has remained steady 
and their peak electrical demand has dropped by 15%. 
The citizens have had their electrical rates drop four 
times since the early 1980s for an overall reduction of  
13%. The town now has the lowest electric rates within 
a 50-mile (801/2-km) radius (5.5 cents per kilowatt- 
hour). Natural gas has followed a similar pattern with 
rates (when corrected for inflation) dropping to half 
of what they were in 1976. Yet, despite these rate cuts, 
the Osage utility department has been able to retire all 
of its debt and accumulated a $2 million surplus. 
The effectiveness of small-scaled explorations can 
also be seen in the community planning efforts docu- 
mented by Ridgeway (1979). The city of Davis, Cali- 
fornia, is illustrative of the effect a moderate-sized 
community can have on energy use. After conducting 
an inquiry into its energy use, the Davis city council 
began experimenting with a large number of energy- 
saving ideas. These ranged from the alteration of  
building codes to favor energy conservation to encour- 
aging city employees to use bicycles when moving 
around town on city business. The data indicated that 
Davis regularly outperformed national conservation 
figures. For instance, two years after adoption of the 
energy-conscious building codes, there was a per cus- 
tomer drop of 12% in electrical consumption. 
Explorations have not been limited to small cities. 
In the mid-1970s, Seattle began an extended political 
debate over whether to participate in the now-defunct 
Washington Public Power System (WPPS). Partly 
through the work of a citizen's committee, given an 
extraordinary free hand by the Seattle City Light top 
bureaucracy (the group that would normally conduct 
the planning process), the city ended up not sup- 
porting the WPPS and instead pursued a long-range 
plan to provide needed energy through conservation. 
In this instance, many small experiments were tried, 
including the development of new building codes, in- 
stallation of a free bus system downtown, and the con- 
duction of neighborhood energy conservation work- 
shops. Even more ambitious ideas were considered, in- 
cluding the use of fast-growing timber as a fuel source 
for power plants and the combining of solar power 
with hydropower. 
Explorations have also been carried out by a few 
pioneering individuals. John Jeavons and his associates 
have examined two vital questions in a world where 35 
million people die from hunger-related disease each 
year- -how much food does a person require in a year 
and how small a piece of land could be made to pro- 
duce that amount of food? (Ruttle 1986). Based upon 
a gardener working alone, they have come up with 
some very hopeful numbers. I f  one uses a variety of 
vegetables and plants (selected for dietary needs and 
productivity) and locates in an area with good soil and 
an eight-month growing season, one needs only 700 sq 
ft (65 m~). Including more popular plants and vege- 
tables, reducing the growing season by half, or starting 
with poorer soil may only double the land area re- 
quired (1400 sq ft or 130 m2). 
Admittedly, such small-scale explorations will not 
always confront a problem in a comprehensive 
manner. Instead, exploration tends to pioneer a par- 
ticular approach, with participants sharing a single vi- 
sion of what is possible. Thus, within the larger con- 
sensus-driven framework of adaptive muddling, there 
is room for the commitment and intensity that are nec- 
essary for creativity and innovation. 
But adaptive muddling offers more than just the 
ability to explore many potential solutions at once. In 
contrast to the authoritarian approach, which must 
work against human ingenuity as it attempts to imple- 
ment a comprehensive solution, adaptive muddling is 
based on people being involved in the decision-making 
process. Adaptive muddling builds on people's desire 
to participate, to do things that can make a difference 
in a larger context and that matter in the long run. At 
a smaller scale, with fewer people involved, it is pos- 
sible for each individual to comprehend the situation 
and for the exploration as a whole to be action ori- 
ented. People are most capable and effective when 
dealing with something they comprehend. They also 
respond well when there is a real opportunity for ac- 
tion (Kaplan and Kaplan 1982). 
Stability 
To deal successfully with the tragedy of the 
commons, one must explore alternative solutions. But 
explorations entail risk and uncertainty: There  is, thus, 
a conflict--exploration is both necessary and dan- 
gerous. In such a situation, one benefits f rom a source 
of  continuing and reliable support. With such support, 
one is freed of  having to develop contingency plans 
against every possible failure (Cantril 1966). 
Providing such stability is the function of  a context 
278 R. De Young and S. Kaplan 
larger than that of  exploration. Stability can occur at 
the level of  the nation, the state, or some other institu- 
tion. By creating the support structure that permits a 
variety of  explorations to take place, it is possible to 
experience errors without endangering the entire 
system. Another advantage of being able to tolerate 
errors is that it permits the exploration of bold and 
innovative solutions. 
There is, thus, a symbiotic relationship between ex- 
ploration and stability. A stable and predictable envi- 
ronment provides a safe and secure source of support 
for exploration. In return, explorations provide tested 
solutions that can be considered for implementation in 
the larger context. Thus, explorations, which may be 
neither tightly interconnected nor centrally managed, 
are nonetheless tied to the larger context via the sta- 
bility concept. 
There are numerous current examples of this rela- 
tionship. It is a feature common to most academic en- 
vironments. Through the process of  tenure, faculty 
are provided with a source of  continuing support re; 
gardless of  the direction their research might take 
them. With their support secured, faculty are freed to 
deal with theories and realms of  thought that they 
might otherwise be wise to ignore or avoid in favor of  
a safer enterprise. 
Interestingly, this combination of  stability and ex- 
ploration has also been identified as  vital to the busi- 
ness world. Those companies that Peters and Wa- 
terman (1989) have identified as top performers 
usually have some sort of  mechanism for encouraging 
small, experimental, " 'skunk works,' bands of eight or 
ten zealots off  in the c o r n e r . . . "  These groups are 
usually left with a free hand and are often allowed to 
operate outside of  the corporate chain of  command. 
This lack of  orthodoxy does not diminish their per- 
ceived value to the corporation. These groups are so 
valued for their innovative contributions that they are 
supported (that is, offered job security) even in the 
event one of the ventures should fail. Peters and Wa- 
terman are blunt as to the effectiveness of this ap- 
proach: "No support systems, no champions. No 
champions, no innovations." 
Another benefit of  permitting many separate ex- 
plorations to take place is the possibility of discovering 
solutions that address local conditions (Peters 1985, 
Runge 1985). Rather than a single experiment, adap- 
tive muddling supports simultaneous explorations. 
While decisions are thus repeated many times over, 
the likelihood is increased that each exploration will 
include more of  the unique facets of  the problem in 
its setting. In the process, a diversity of  solutions 
emerges. In this manner, regional differences in envi- 
ronmental conditions or resource availability are ad- 
dressed directly, not through the ad hoc modification 
of a "master" plan. 
Distributed Leadership 
An unintended consequence of a coercive solution 
is, as we have seen, that people are inclined to act in 
opposition to what they are told to do. This will be 
true whether the source of the solution is from an au- 
thoritarian bureaucracy as in authoritarianism or from 
a panel of  experts as in most democratic decision- 
making processes. Adaptive muddling, by contrast, 
benefits from the insight and talent of the entire na- 
tion, experts and citizens. A major way in which 
people feel needed and can contribute to the problem- 
solving process is through distributed leadership. 
Leadership has little or no explicit role in ordinary 
muddling; by contrast, in adaptive muddling, leader- 
ship is central. At the same time, leadership is not seen 
as residing in one or even a few individuals. The lead- 
ership appropriate to adaptive muddling depends 
upon contributions of  many kinds, coming from 
people representing diverse skills, abilities, and in- 
terests. The effectiveness of distributed leadership de- 
pends upon its broad base of  contribution and the di- 
versity of its contributors (Wildavsky 1964). This can 
perhaps best be appreciated in the context of adaptive 
change. The clear message of the commons dilemma 
analysis is that human patterns must change, and 
change far faster than can be accommodated by bio- 
logical modification. The burden, then, is necessarily 
on cultural rather than genetic evolution. Convincing 
a culture to adopt new patterns is admittedly a difficult 
task. Several factors, however, can facilitate the pro- 
cess. The provision of these facilitating factors is the 
role of distributed leadership. There are three distinct 
functions here, which might appropriately be labeled 
vision, process, and themes for exploration. These provide 
an essential support for the active cognitive basis upon 
which adaptive muddling depends. A brief sketch of 
each should make their significance clear. 
The first function of distributed leadership is vision 
- - t h e  creating of  an understanding of  our situation, 
the possibility of  a solution, and the challenge it offers 
to everyone. The urgency of the tragedy of  the 
commons must be understood by all. There must be a 
shared understanding that this dilemma must be 
faced, not deliberately avoided. The very nature of the 
dilemma causes some individuals to feel helpless. 
Leadership must show that not only can a decent life- 
style be salvaged, but that there is the possibility of  im- 
proving our  quality of  life in the process. 
Another function of leadership is to create and 
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support a process for meeting thechal lenge of the 
tragedy of  the commons. Leadership must clarify the 
role of  exploration and stability. It is necessary to un- 
derstand that the failure of explorations is an accept- 
able, and even necessary, outcome of the process. In 
fact, Peters and Waterman (1982) report that an indi- 
cator of  success in a company is not only its being in- 
dined to try something out, but a willingness to tol- 
erate and even celebrate failure. The acceptance of  
failure may be made easier by developing the expecta- 
tion that solutions discovered during explorations will 
become part of  the stable, larger-scale institution. By 
understanding the dynamics of the exploration-sta- 
bility relationship, it should become clear that failure 
of an idea at the exploratory stage is information vital 
to the system as a whole. 
And finally, it is the role of leadership to identify 
and nominate themes for exploration. It is difficult to 
generate ideas that are worth pursuing. Themes that 
are worth exploring must fit a certain profile: they 
must deal with the problem and be compatible with 
human nature and available resources. Leadership in 
this context is more than just power or charisma. It 
involves insight that appreciates both the nature of the 
problem and of  the people who must ultimately deal 
with it. 
Adaptive muddling draws on the many facets of 
leadership, from the cultural and visionary to the day- 
to-day politics of  the process and to the conceptual 
issues involved in particular explorations. It is not fea- 
sible, or even desirable, that one individual will fulfill 
all leadership functions. From this perspective, one 
can see leadership as coming from many sources. The 
novelist and poet who address the issue of environ- 
mental limits and suggest alternate patterns of living 
constitute important examples. At the same time, lead- 
ership is also demonstrated by citizens who, tired of  
red tape and delays, form grass-roots organizations to 
take direct action on an issue. The theoretician who 
suggests a strategy worth exploring provides a rather 
different, but no less important, aspect of this neces- 
sarily widely shared form of leadership. Clearly, adap- 
tive muddling is more concerned with the insight that 
leadership provides than with the source of this in- 
sight. 
There are numerous examples of leadership spring- 
ing up without the encouragement of centralized au- 
thorities. Consider the Meadowcreek Project. 7 These 
are people intensely aware of  the environmental di- 
lemmas being faced, but are unwilling to adopt a 
dismal outlook. Where others see a future clouded 
over with sacrifice, poverty, and famine, Meadowcreek 
sees a future demanding our participation, intelli- 
gence, and ingenuity. Rather than avoiding dealing 
with the dilemmas facing society, they spend all of 
their time on them, and not just by writing about the 
opportunities. Meadowcreek is the sort of hands-on 
educa~tion and research organization that adaptive 
muddling is all about. They have created not only a 
vision of a positive future, but a location where themes 
suggested by others can be explored. 
Another organization demonstrating such leader- 
ship is the Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI), s which ac- 
tively promotes alternate approaches to energy, water, 
and agriculture policy. Their  pragmatic end-use/least- 
cost approach to energy options is an idea that took 
only a decade to move from a theme worthy of explo- 
ration into the mainstream of  energy analysis. The 
RMI suggests that this approach can probably be re- 
peated with other resources (Rocky Mountain Institute 
1986). 
Such an approach to problem solving in a cultural 
framework admittedly requires a great deal of human 
talent and effort. This approach may in fact appear to 
be inordinately costly. On the other hand, the environ- 
mental dilemma themes are at least as important as 
many currently being explored in science fiction, films, 
political campaigns, talk shows, and the other cultural 
forums of our time. Thus, to some degree, commons- 
related themes might come to replace currently pop- 
ular topics. But such a simple substitution of  themes is 
unlikely to be enough. Adaptive muddling may well 
require a considerable infusion of additional thought 
and effort. 
It is thus likely that new talent must be enlisted to 
meet, this heavy set of demands. While this could be 
counted a cost, we are more inclined to consider it a 
benefit. We live in a culture where the sense of not 
being needed, of being surplus, is widespread. Surely 
participation is to be preferred to further alienation. 
An increased capacity to involve talent not now being 
used might well improve the quality of life of these 
pioneers of this latest of frontiers. The potential ben- 
efits are, of course, not limited to the most active par- 
ticipants, for this is not an optional frontier, but one 
that must be dealt with, and dealt with forcefully and 
creatively, if it is not to be our  last. 
Adaptive Muddling and the Problem of Small Steps 
A key issue as far as adaptive muddling is con- 
cerned is how the potentially fatal "small step" bias of 
conventional muddling can be corrected. As long as 
only modest steps are taken, the solution to problems 
will necessarily be slow and frequently too slow. Adap- 
tive muddling deals with this difficulty on two fronts. 
One source of reactance to new ideas and new al- 
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ternatives is the fear of  change. While this may seem to 
be a rather foolish and small-minded fear, in recent 
times it has all too often been justified. Whether justi- 
fied or not, however, such a fear can readily block in- 
novation before a new possibility has even had a fair 
hearing. Here the stability aspect of  adaptive mud- 
dling plays a central role. It provides assurance that 
unchecked and disorienting change is unlikely to 
occur. The stability-preserving feature of adaptive 
muddling will tend to block the widespread imple- 
mentation of untested solutions. 
A second factor is even more central. Much of  what 
is considered a bias toward the status quo is in fact a 
bias toward the familiar. Although this may sound as if 
it is a rather small, perhaps even academic, distinction, 
it is in fact a crucial issue and one with major implica- 
tions. A status quo bias means that little will change, 
and what does change will change only very slowly. A 
familiarity bias, by contrast, means that the size of the 
step is limited not by where people are, but by what 
they know. The  key issue, in other words, is the sort 
of  knowledge and experience that people have, not 
merely what their current circumstances happen to be. 
Fortunately, people can liave knowledge and experi- 
ence that extend far beyond the comfortable outline of  
the status quo. 
It should perhaps be emphasized that a familiarity 
bias is not an expression of a foolish conservatism, but 
is in general a sound and reasonable practice. To 
move significantly beyond what one is familiar with is 
an invitation to disaster. Being on unfamiliar ground, 
one not only does not know what to do if something 
goes wrong; one may not even know what "wrong" 
looks like. Even the familiar is susceptible to surprise 
and uncertainty; managing these hazards outside of  
one's comprehension and confidence is a risky propo- 
sition indeed. 
Since people are conceptual animals, what they can 
become familiar with is, fortunately, not limited to 
what they have experienced in a direct and literal 
sense. People can acquire familiarity through the 
written word, through artistic creations, and ~ r o u g h  
simulations of  various kinds (for instance, plays, TV, 
and computers). Here both leadership and explora- 
tion have key roles. Leadership can provide the im- 
agery and the richness of  context necessary to allow 
people to build models of  the not yet present. Explora- 
tion can provide concrete alternatives that deserve at- 
tention and thought. 
Although this discussion has followed a path quite 
distinct from that used by Edney (1980), the proposed 
framework is consistent with his analysis. His focus is 
on territory and trust as contexts for appropriate be- 
havior. The familiarity concept is a means for devel- 
oping the territorial feelings that he points out can be 
so powerfully motivating. Edney's concept of trust is 
even more closely aligned with adaptive muddling. 
Trust, while highly compatible with a democratic 
framework, is nonetheless a risky and potentially un- 
stable venture. Edney suggests that this trust is stabi- 
lized by the territorial division of the commons. Adap- 
tive muddling provides other stabilizing influences. 
The small scale of  the explorations allows one to take 
advantage of  the trust-building factors of  shared im- 
agery, group cohesiveness, and open communications 
(Stern 1978). A related issue is the mutual predict- 
ability of behavior at the smaller scale. It is far less 
risky to invest in trust building when one can reason- 
ably assess others' behavior. And finally, the stability of 
the larger scale reduces the impact of a significant loss 
should an exploration fail or trust collapse. 
Conclusion 
In the parable of the tragedy of the commons, 
humans have been offered an early warning of what 
the future may hold, yet the response to date has been 
ambiguous. There are, of  course, many reasons why 
people might avoid a confrontation with the realities 
of  a people-rich, resource-poor future. One reason has 
already been ment ioned--fear  of  change. But there 
are other barriers to action: a fear of disorder, a sense 
of  helplessness, a feeling that there are no workable 
alternatives. Within the adaptive muddling frame- 
work, however, such concerns lose their significance. It 
is not necessary to give up all the things that one holds 
dear: order, predictability, hope, the desire to create a 
decent future for our children. 
Clearly, the adaptive muddling framework has both 
limitations and advantages. Both our analysis and pre- 
scription are limited to the political and cultural setting 
of  the United States although it may also apply to 
other well-established democracies. In addition, the 
adaptive muddling framework does not address cer- 
tain very serious, large-scale problems that haunt 
human survival (for example, the carbon dioxide 
buildup in the atmosphere or acid precipitation caused 
by multinational activities). It is not yet clear just what 
other limitations there might be to our approach. 
Adaptive muddling is not proposed as a panacea; it is 
intended to address the vast number of  environmental 
problems where solutions can be explored at a small 
scale. 
The advantages offered by the adaptive muddling 
framework can be understood in its comparison with 
the authoritarian and conventional muddling ap- 
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proaches. Two issues highlight these advantagesm 
how each problem-solving process deals with people 
and the character of solutions generated. 
The authoritarian solution is characterized by the 
limited role offered individual citizens, There is room 
for their approval of the selected solution, but no op- 
portunity for them to influence the choice. Even in 
democracies, the situation is often far from ideal. Wil- 
liams (1986) describes citizen participation as "citizens 
(usually sitting passively in chairs) posing questions 
and comments to experts (if male, usually wearing a 
necktie). Two messages are clear: Citizens only have 
input as outsiders into a process controlled by profes- 
sionals; and citizen involvement (as both obligation 
and privilege) is limited to planning." The success of  
adaptive muddling, by contrast, is both sensitive t o  
human concerns and relies on the talent of its citizens. 
Again, Williams (1986) suggests that citizens "have 
more than just input into a process; they also shape 
and define the project through their own actions." 
A similar contrast exists for the type of outcome 
desired by each decision-making process. The authori- 
tarian approach seeks a comp.rehensive and unidi- 
mensional solution--an Optimal response to the 
tragedy of the commons. Conventional muddling, 
with its reliance on due process, is neutral on the de- 
sired outcome. If a solution proceeds all the way 
through the tortuous procedure of due process, it will 
be acceptable. In contrast, the type of solution to 
emerge from adaptive muddling is largely indepen- 
dent of the problem-solving process. The solutions de- 
veloped will be mainly influenced by the particular 
people involved in the adaptive muddling process and, 
via this direct involvement, a substantial increase in the 
overall commitment to the solution will develop. 
The advantages of adaptive muddling over 
Hardin's mutual coercion mutually agreed upon are of  
a similar nature. In contrast to the perceived bleakness 
of mutual coercion, adaptive muddling offers a way 
for people to be inspired by challenge. The necessary 
solutions, far from being obvious, will require cre- 
ativity and innovation. Rather than an enforced uni- 
formity, there is likely to be considerable diversity in 
the patterns of solutions adopted by different indi- 
viduals. By engaging the imagination and preserving 
choice, adaptive muddling gains a substantial benefit 
both politically and psychologically. 
Feasibility and Implementation 
To some, our proposal might seem too close to the 
status quo. After all, there is considerable small-scale 
experimenting going on and muddling is certainly a 
major factor in the governmental process. A grave 
weakness in the current situation, however, is that 
there is little or no linkage between these two domains 
of activity. Government neither provides support and 
encouragement for the explorations nor, by and large, 
utilizes the results. 
Others may argue that our proposal is a renamed 
version of the "experimenting society" first proposed 
by Campbell (1981). The experimenting society is 
based on the central concept that governmental pro- 
grams should be designed as experiments, complete 
with a built-in evaluation procedure? This evaluation 
is to be the province of social scientists; Campbell calls 
for rigorous, expertly designed experiments and rig- 
orous statistical analyses. The results are intended to 
provide input to policy makers to guide decisions. But 
Campbell acknowledges that the results of such anal- 
yses tend to have little influence on the governmental 
process. 
Our approach uses the concept of an experiment in 
a less restricted sense. Viewing an experiment as an 
organized way of learning from experience makes it 
available on a large scale as a means of exploring alter- 
natives. We see the analysis of  such experiments as 
being less formal and more compatible with current 
cultural channels. Newspaper accounts, reports by 
participants, visits by interested individuals, and the 
like, would be appropriate supplements to whatever 
record keeping or other hard data are available. The 
more specialized framing of an experiment and its 
evaluation make it not only less accessible, but also less 
likely to have impact. 
Another contrast between these approaches con- 
cerns the degree to which the origin and guidance of 
the experiments are centralized or decentralized. It is 
clear that adaptive muddling falls on the grass-roots 
side of this spectrum. This might appear to be unreal- 
istic, or at the least overly idealistic. On the other hand, 
Naisbitt (1984) has made a compelling case for the ar- 
gument that the important trends do not in fact origi- 
nate in Washington and New York. Many of the grass- 
roots themes that he identifies are quite compatible 
with adaptive muddling. These emphasize decentrali- 
zation, networking, participatory democracy, an in- 
creased orientation to self-help, and an emphasis on 
multiple options. 
While our proposal is thus not a restatement of the 
experimenting society or a description of the statUS 
quo, neither is it particularly utopian. It does not 
promise an easy happy ending to a difficult problem. 
We see a number of small but crucial changes as at  
least mitigating a dangerous situation. These changes 
will not produce instant paradise. Given the intracta- 
bility of the tragedy of the commons and the urgency 
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o f  arrest ing these destructive trends, even a modest  
improvemen t  would be welcome. 
T h e r e  is growing evidence that behavior  is strongly 
affected by the m o d e l  o f  the world one  holds. What  is 
lacking in the present  situation is a model  that relates 
what  exper iment ing  does occur  to the decision-making 
process. Thus ,  implementat ion requires, at its roots, a 
change  in the shared model  o f  the governmenta l  pro- 
cess. We have a t tempted to sketch out  a blueprint  for  
this needed  model.  Its major  componen ts  can be de- 
scribed concisely. It  requires acknowledging a problem 
(that is, enVironmental limitations) that  tends to be de- 
nied. I t  requires a clear policy to the effect that (a) 
ou tcomes  matter,  (b) these outcomes cannot  be known 
without  exploration, (c) this explorat ion is best done  at 
a small scale, and  (d) in o rde r  to f ind solutions in a 
timely fashion, many such experiments  must  go on si- 
multaneously.  
Thus ,  the pr imary  ingredients already exist. T h e  
talent exists. T h e  problems exist . .The history o f  mud-  
dling exists. What  is required is the adopt ion o f  a new 
way o f  thinking about  how these componen ts  can be 
b r o u g h t  together  into a larger whole that is chal- 
lenging, inspiring, and effective. 
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Notes 
1. At a time of enormous growth.in the literature on the 
tragedy of  the commons, with the parallel effort to differen- 
tiate between different types of  commons, there has been 
work suggesting that many apparently separate decision- 
making problems are, in fact, similar. Dawes (1973, 1975, 
1977, and 1980), who has been influential in expanding our 
understanding of  these dilemmas, has suggested that the 
term "social dilemma" be used to encompass commons di- 
lemmas, social traps (Platt 1973), and the prisoner's dilemma 
(Coombs and others 1972) since all share certain essential 
characteristics. Another researcher (Komorita 1976) has 
shown that, despite the apparent differences between the 
prisoner's dilemma and the commons dilemma, the pris- 
oner's dilemma is, in terms of decision-making mathematics, 
a special case of  the commons dilemma. 
2. Scholars have identified a number of  characteristics of 
environmental problems that prevent their straightforward 
solution (for instance, consequences may be irreversible, ef- 
fects may be dispersed in both time and space or may appear 
after a long time lag, or there may be imperfect access to 
information). See Bartlett (1986) and Dryzek (1983a and b) 
for a discussion of these and other constraints. This article 
adds certain cognitive needs and constraints inherent in 
solving environmental problems. A systematic cognitive anal- 
ysis of  the requirements for reasonable human behavior can 
be found in Kaplan and Kaplan (1982). In addition, see Can- 
tril (1966), who has provided a compilation of universal 
human concerns in his last chapter. 
3. Dryzek (1983b) has noted that democratic societies, on 
finding themselves unable to act effectively, may find it nec- 
essary to adopt an authoritarian system. This is sometimes 
observed during wartime. 
4. For a discussion of resilience and resource manage- 
ment, see Lovins and Lovins (1982). 
5. The matter is certainly more complicated than pre- 
sented here. Muddling through is usually considered not a 
procedure, but a description of how public policy is actually 
made. Lindblom's (1979) prescription for improving public 
policy making is a process that he labels disjointed incremen- 
talism. This article uses the term "muddling through" to rep- 
resent Lindblom's contribution to the field of public decision 
making. 
6. While muddling began as a description of the 
problem-solving process utilized by policy makers, Orr (1986) 
has shown how muddling is generally associated with the 
preservation of the status quo. We have attempted to show 
how correcting this difficulty allows a society to approximate 
the "adaptive scenarios" that Orr so effectively describes. 
7. The Meadowcreek Project, Inc., Fox, Arkansas 72051, 
USA. 
8. Rocky Mountain Institute, Drawer 248, Old Snow- 
mass, Colorado 81654, USA. 
9. Dryzek (1983a) also promotes the idea that public 
policy analysis must move well beyond the simple assessment 
and selection of "pre-ordained and well-designed alterna- 
fives, and toward policy design." 
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